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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to the proceedings below, from which order 
this appeal is taken, did not include appellants Charles Schultz 
and Robert Pett. The parties below were plaintiff Sure-Tech, LLC 
and defendants E.M.L. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd. 
and Waste Products, Inc. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction would be vested in this Court pursuant to 
the transfer of this appeal to this Court from the Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j), were appellants proper 
parties to bring this appeal. 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Issues of Fact 
1. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
Charles Schultz ("Schultz") did not revoke his offer to transfer 
his membership interest in Sure-Tech, LLC to Steve Evans 
("Evans") or his nominee prior to the time Evans accepted the 
offer? (Tr. at 69-70.) 
2. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
that Schultz and Robert Pett ("Pett") did not have managerial 
responsibility in Sure-Tech at the time Sure-Tech and defendant 
entered into a stipulation of dismissal? (Tr. at 71.) 
3. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
that Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of 
dismissal on behalf of Sure-Tech? (Tr. at 71.) 
4. Does the evidence show that the court erred in 
relying on Evans' testimony, to the extent the court did so rely? 
1 
Issues of Law 
1. Did the trial court rule correctly on the admission 
of documentary evidence and witness testimony? (Tr. at 69.) 
2. Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law, 
that Evans had authority to dismiss the litigation on behalf of 
Sure-Tech? (Tr. at 71.) 
3. Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law, 
on the admissibility of evidence? (Tr. at 56, 69.) 
4. Did the court rule correctly in denying appellants' 
Rule 60(b)(3) motion? (R. at 1427.) 
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), except 
that the court's denial of appellants' Rule 60(b)(3) motion is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-112. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-122. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a) . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). 
Utah R. Evid. 608. 
Utah R. Evid. 609. 
Utah R. Evid. 1002. 
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Utah R. Evid. 1003. 
Utah R. Evid. 1004. 
Complete copies of these determinative statutes and 
rules are attached as Appendix A. 
VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant, who was not a party to the action below, 
seeks to have the Court's stipulated dismissal of the underlying 
action brought by Sure-Tech, LLC set aside on the grounds that 
the court below wrongly determined that Steve Evans had authority 
to settle the case on behalf of plaintiff Sure-Tech, LLC. 
B. Proceedings Below 
This case was brought by Sure-Tech, LLC, a limited 
partner of E.M.L. Projects, Ltd. ("E.M.L.P."). Schultz, the 
appellant, represented Sure-Tech until the court disqualified him 
by order entered April 4, 1995 after a hearing held November 23, 
1994. (R. at 1235-40.) Subsequently, Sure-Tech retained Scott 
Daniels of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, who settled the action 
on behalf of Sure-Tech. Daniels entered an appearance on behalf 
of Sure-Tech (R. at 1256-57), and Sure-Tech and E.M.L.P. filed a 
stipulation of dismissal with the court on or about April 21, 
1995. (R. at 1252-53.) Schultz then wrote to Judge Brian 
claiming that he and Pett were the managers and sole members of 
Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent Sure-
3 
Tech. (R. at 1258.) Daniels requested a hearing to "take 
evidence and determine who has authority to act on behalf of 
Sure-Tech." (R. at 1261-63.) 
On May 22, the court scheduled a one-half hour hearing 
on May 30 to hear the motion to dismiss. (R. at 1290-91.) The 
hearing actually lasted more than two hours. (Transcript of May 
30, 1995 hearing ("Tr.") at 69. ) 1 The notice of hearing was 
silent as to whether the court would take evidence (see R. at 
1290) ; however, the request for hearing had mentioned the need 
for evidence. (See R. at 1262.) At the hearing, Schultz neither 
objected to the taking of evidence nor sought a continuance. 
(See, e.g., Tr. at 3.) Moreover, in addition to legal argument, 
Edwin Guyon ("Guyon"), who represented Schultz at the hearing, 
put on both witness testimony and documentary evidence of his own 
and cross-examined witnesses put on by Daniels. (See, e.g., Tr. 
at 17 (cross-examination by Guyon of S. Evans); Tr. at 19 
(entering into evidence of the purported operating agreement of 
Sure-Tech); Tr. at 57 (direct examination by Guyon of Schultz).) 
C. Disposition 
After argument and allowing additional witnesses and 
proffers from Guyon (Tr. at 53-56), the court ruled that by 
Schultz's letter of November 17, 1994 (PL's Ex. 6) Schultz and 
1
 The transcript, which was not prepared until January 
31, 1997, was not paginated as part of the record when this brief 
was prepared. Hence, references to the May 30, 1995 hearing 
transcript are to the transcript page. (See Appendix B.) 
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Pett offered to convey their interests in Sure-Tech to Evans or 
his nominee (Tr. at 69); that Evans accepted that offer by his 
January 9, 1995 letter (Ex. 7; see Tr. at 70); that on April 9, 
the members of Sure-Tech held a meeting and "in reliance on the 
documents of November of 1994 and January of 1995" substituted 
Evans as the new registered agent in place of Schultz and 
replaced Schultz and Pett as managers (Tr. at 70), and then 
negotiated and finalized the Settlement Agreement. (Tr. at 71.) 
The court upheld the Settlement Agreement and dismissed the 
action. (Tr. at 71.) 
Thereafter, Schultz filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, 
seeking to set aside the order on the ground that Evans lied 
under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing. (R. at 1368-80.) 
Schultz attached a letter dated November 22, 1994 from Schultz to 
Evans, which Guyon had sent to the Court the day after the 
hearing. (See R. at 1298-1304.) Schultz claimed the November 22 
letter revoked his November 17, 1994 offer, and, as Evans now 
admitted he had received the November 22, 1994 letter, showed 
that Evans had perjured himself. (R. at 1373-76.)2 The court 
denied Schultz's motion without opinion on August 9, 1995. (R. 
at 1427.) Schultz originally filed a notice of appeal on July 3, 
1995 (R. at 1404-05) and filed an amended notice on August 29, 
1995. (R. at 1434-35.) 
2
 The exhibits to Schultz's Rule 60(b)(3) motion appear 
to have been misfiled in the record, and appear at R. 1306-57. 
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D. Statement of Facts 
The court's order dismissing this case was entered in 
the record May 30, 1995 and appears at R. 1297. A review of 
appellant's Statement of Facts reveals that many of the "facts" 
on which they rely to demonstrate the trial court's error were 
not actually before the court at the time it ruled. (See 
Appellants' Statement of Facts KH 1, 2, 21, 28, 29, 35-40.)3 
Moreover, most of Schultz's "facts" are badly misstated. An 
accurate rendition of the relevant facts actually before the 
trial court follows. 
1. Sure-Tech is a Utah limited liability company 
formed on January 14, 1993. The Articles of Organization of 
Sure-Tech indicated that Robert Pett and Charles Schultz were the 
original managers. It did not state who the members were. (See 
PL's Ex. 4 at 2, received into evidence at Tr. 12. ) 4 
2. Sure-Tech was formed, at least in part, to 
distribute profits from E.M.L.P., a limited partnership of which 
3
 Although exhibits supporting much of appellants' facts 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 were introduced by appellants at the May 
30th hearing, appellants do not reference those exhibits. 
Instead, they cite to subsequent submissions and do not inform 
this Court which of the listed items were received in evidence by 
the trial court. 
4
 All citations to exhibits are to the exhibits 
introduced at the May 30, 1995 hearing, unless otherwise noted. 
As those exhibits also had not been paginated as part of the 
record at this writing, they are referred to by their exhibit 
number assigned at the hearing. 
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Sure-Tech was a 20% partner. (Testimony of Schultz, Tr. at 25; 
R. at 3.) 
3. On April 11, 1994, Sure-Tech, represented by 
Schultz, filed this lawsuit to dissolve E.M.L.P. (See R. at 2-
80.) 
4. In May 1994, plaintiff and defendants each filed a 
motion to disqualify the other party's counsel. (R. at 96-151, 
1263A-L.)5 Both motions were heard November 23, 1994. The 
court sustained both motions. (R. at 1172, 1174.) 
5. The Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 
E.M.L.P.'s motion to disqualify Schultz as counsel for Sure-Tech 
was entered April 4, 1995. (R. at 1235-40.) The court 
disqualified Schultz because he had been employed by, had 
rendered legal advice to, and had received a monthly retainer 
from E.M.L.P., one of the defendants. (R. at 1237-38.) 
6. On November 17, 1994, just prior to the hearing on 
the motions to disqualify, Schultz wrote to Evans offering to 
return to Evans or his nominee his and Robert Pett's interests in 
Sure-Tech. (PL's Ex. 6; Tr. at 11-12.) 
7. Evans accepted Schultz's offer on January 9, 1995, 
and designated his parents, Beatrice and Fred Evans, as his 
5
 The papers seeking disqualification of Callister 
Nebeker & McCullough, filed in May 1994, appear to be misfiled in 
the record. 
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nominees to receive Schultz's interest in Sure-Tech. (PL's Ex. 
7; Tr. at 12.) 
8. On or about April 4, 1995, Evans, his mother 
Beatrice Evans, his father Fred Evans, and Lionel Koon, as 
members of Sure-Tech, agreed to settle this lawsuit and various 
other disputes between them and the defendants to this lawsuit. 
(See PL's Ex. 3 at 2.) 
9. At an April 9, 1995 meeting called by Evans, Evans, 
his father Fred Evans, and Lionel Koon, who at the meeting became 
a five percent member of Sure-Tech, voted Schultz and Pett out as 
managers and replaced Schultz as registered agent. (Pl.'s Ex. 5; 
Tr. at 7.) 
10. Sure-Tech then retained Daniels to represent it, 
and Sure-Tech and E.M.L.P. entered into a Stipulation of 
Dismissal of this lawsuit. (R. at 1252-53, 1256-57.) A copy of 
the Stipulation was sent to Schultz. 
11. Upon receipt of the Stipulation, Schultz wrote to 
the court claiming that Daniels lacked authority to enter into 
the Stipulation on behalf of Sure-Tech, as he and Pett were Sure-
Tech's managers and sole members. (R. at 1258.) 
12. Daniels then requested an evidentiary hearing to 
determine who had authority to represent Sure-Tech. (R. at 1261-
62. ) 
13. The court scheduled the hearing for one-half hour 
on May 30, 1995. (R. at 1290.) 
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14. At the hearing, both sides presented evidence and 
made argument to the court. Schultz was represented by Guyon. 
Guyon did not object to the court taking evidence and did not 
seek a continuance. (See Tr. at 3.) 
15. Evans testified as to Schultz's offer to transfer 
his interest in Sure-Tech, Evans' acceptance of that offer, the 
April 9, 1995 meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, and the 
Settlement Agreement he signed on behalf of Sure-Tech to end the 
lawsuit. (Tr. at 3-12, 20-21.) He also testified that he had 
never before seen the Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech introduced 
at the hearing by Guyon. (Tr. at 19; see also id. at 18.) 
16. Schultz also testified at the May 30 hearing. 
(See Tr. at 23-27, 57-64.) 
17. He testified that he and Pett were the only 
members of Sure-Tech. (Tr. at 57-58.) He introduced various 
organizational documents of Sure-Tech in support of his claim. 
(See PL's Exs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G (received at Tr. at 56).) 
18. Schultz admitted sending Exhibit 6 to Evans and 
receiving Exhibit 7 from Evans. (Tr. at 25-26.) Schultz 
testified that in the November 17th letter (Ex. 6) "we were 
offering to convey it [Sure-Tech] to him [Evans]." (Tr. at 61.) 
19. Schultz also testified, however, that ten days or 
two seeks after sending the November 17 letter (Ex. 6) he send 
Evans another letter revoking his offer. (Tr. at 27.) Although 
9 
Schultz said he had the revocation letter in his files, he did 
not bring it to the court. (Tr. at 27-28.) 
20. Evans denied having received a letter revoking 
Schultz's November 17, 1994 offer. (Tr. at 29.) 
21. Guyon recognized he had "some evidentiary 
problems" without the letter. (Tr. at 35.) Subsequently, he 
requested additional time to get the alleged revocation letter to 
the court. (Tr. at 50.) Guyon then put on additional testimony. 
At all times the court remained willing to consider the letter if 
it arrived before the hearing ended. (See Tr. at 50, 65.) 
22. Although the court indicated it would give little 
weight to any evidence other than the alleged revocation letter 
itself, it gave Guyon the choice of calling witnesses or 
proffering their testimony. Guyon chose to make a proffer of the 
testimony of Schultz and Lisa Spivey, secretary to Schultz, 
although both were in the courtroom. (Tr. at 53.) He also 
subsequently put Schultz on the stand. (Tr. at 57-60.) 
23. Based on the evidence before it, the court found: 
The hearing was set for 9:00 a.m., May 30, 1995. It is 
now ten after eleven. The estimate for the hearing was 
one hour. The Court still has not received any letter 
from the office of Mr. Schultz, indicating that there 
was a change in the position of Mr. Schultz to convey 
his interest to the Evanses on the Sure-Tech company. 
And the Court finds that the best evidence rule 
applies, and, absent any document to the contrary, the 
Court does not give any substantial weight to the 
representations made that after November 17, 1994, and 
before January 9 of 1995, or before April 9 of 1995, 
10 
there was ever any change in Mr. Schultz' willingness 
to convey his interest in Sure-Tech. 
The Court further finds as follows: The chronology 
of events are as follows: November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans 
is the recipient of a letter authored by Mr. Schultz, 
wherein he stated as follows: "It is ny intention to 
convey my interest in Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming 
that's Bob Pett, "will also convey his interest in 
Sure-Tech to you or to whoever you direct. Advise me 
to whom you wish it conveyed. I will not dismiss the 
case against EML so that you or whomever you direct can 
decide what to do." That's precisely what occurred 
several months later. "However, I am going to withdraw 
as counsel for Sure-Tech after the conveyance and after 
the pending motions are decided." 
The next document which the Court finds to be 
significant is the letter of January 9, 1995, the 
recipient being Mr. Charles A. Schultz, the author 
being Mr. Steve Evans. That letter confirms, in 
substance, their willingness to accept a conveyance, by 
Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, the withdrawal of any 
interest they have in Sure-Tech, and conveying any 
interest, whatever it may be, percentage-wise, of Sure-
Tech to the Evanses. 
The next document of interest is the April 9, 1995 
meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, wherein, in 
reliance on the documents of November of 1994 and 
January of 1995, they conducted their business, 
substituted Mr. Schultz as the registered agent, 
replaced Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, pursuant to the 
prior agreement, as managers, and proceeded to 
designate new managers and new registered agents. 
The next document of interest is a letter dated 
April 21, 1995, to Mr. Evans, authored by Mr. Schultz, 
wherein, in paragraph 6, Mr. Schultz again reconfirms 
that he and Mr. Pett will convey all interest in Sure-
Tech. I mean, the only documents in the record before 
the Court are consistent in that regard. 
The Court finds that, based on all of those 
documents, and the conduct of the business owners, that 
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, at least for purposes of 
today's hearing, did not have any managerial 
responsibilities in Sure-Tech. Thereafter, a 
settlement agreement was entered into between the 
11 
plaintiffs, Sure-Tech, LLC, and the defendants, EML 
Projects, et al. 
The Court finds that there was both express and 
implied authority by the plaintiffs and the defendants 
to enter into the settlement agreement. 
The Court further finds that the parties relied to 
the mutual detriment of each other in negotiating and 
finalizing the settlement agreement and that the 
settlement agreement is upheld by this Court. 
The Court further finds that the order of 
dismissal is appropriate in connection with the 
settlement agreement, and it will be signed May 30, 
1995. 
(Tr. at 69-71.) 
24. The day following the hearing, Guyon sent the 
court a copy of the alleged letter of revocation (hereafter the 
"November 22 letter"). It states: 
I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the 
hearing today. The case against EML was only filed in 
order to secure your rights to work in the 
environmental field and particularly the right to use 
the waste water treatment system you assigned to EML 
However, due to your failure to attend the hearing and 
due also to Lionel's failure to attend, I was 
disqualified as counsel for Sure-Tech. 
If you do not care about protecting your interests, I 
sure as hell don't. I am going to settle the suit 
against EML on the best terms for Sure-Tech. A 
settlement may have some incidental and unintentional 
affect on your patent claims. Therefore, I suggest 
that you obtain personal legal representation to advise 
you. 
Sincerely: 
/ & / 
Charles A. Schultz 
(R. at 1302.) 
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25. Subsequently, Schultz filed a motion for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), Utah R. Civ. P. (R. at 
1371-76.) In his memorandum in support of his Rule 60(b) motion, 
Schultz argued that the November 22 letter proved (a) that he had 
revoked his November 17, 1994 offer, and (b) that Evans, because 
he denied receiving the letter of revocation, had committed 
perjury. 
26. The court denied Schultz's Rule 60(b) motion 
August 9, 1995. (R. at 1427.) 
27. Appellants first filed their Notice of Appeal July 
31, 1995, and filed an Amended Notice of Appeal after the court 
denied their Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 1404-05 and 1434-35.) 
VIII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants lack standing to prosecute this appeal 
because they were not parties below. Under precedent from both 
the both Utah and United States Supreme Courts, unless a person 
formally becomes a party below, he may not bring an appeal. In 
addition to appellants' lack of party status, policy 
considerations militate against allowing these appellants 
standing to appeal. Schultz, an attorney knowledgeable about 
rules of procedure, was earlier disqualified from representing 
Sure-Tech in this very litigation. In addition, allowing these 
plaintiffs to pursue this appeal will open the floodgates of 
litigation to disgruntled corporate shareholders and limited 
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liability companies, and is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-
112. 
If the Court finds that appellants have standing, 
however, it must affirm the decision below on the merits because 
the trial court committed no reversible error of fact or law. 
Appellants are precluded from challenging the court's factual 
findings by their failure to marshal the evidence supporting that 
decision. When that evidence is marshalled, it is apparent that 
the great weight of the evidence supports the trial court's 
findings of fact, which must not be disturbed. 
Appellants' legal arguments also fail. Although legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, appellants have shown 
no bases for finding any of the trial court's rulings to be 
erroneous. Moreover, appellants' failure to preserve the issues 
they raise in this appeal bars them from raising those issues 
here. 
Finally, appellants have not met their burden of 
showing that the trial court erred in denying their Rule 30(b)(3) 
motion. This court must review that denial under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Because appellants did not in their Rule 
60(b)(3) motion show by clear and convincing evidence that a 
party's fraud precluded them from getting a fair hearing, the 
judge properly denied the motion. 
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IX 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO APPEAL, 
AS THEY WERE NOT PARTIES BELOW 
A. Only One Who Was a Party Below Has Standing 
to Appeal. 
Only a party has standing to bring an appeal. Thus, in 
Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court dismissed an appeal filed by an insurance company which had 
been a party to the case but which was dismissed from the suit 
prior to final judgment being entered. Because the appellant "is 
no longer a party to the action before us," said the court, it 
"has no standing to take this appeal." Id. at 1155. See also 
Rule 3(b)-(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (referring 
repeatedly to "party" or "parties"). 
The United States Supreme Court also requires that an 
appellant formally become a party below. In Marino v. Ortiz, 484 
U.S. 301, 484 U.S. 1082 (1988), a case that procedurally 
parallels this case, a group of police officers brought an action 
claiming civil rights violations. The case was resolved by entry 
of a consent decree. Another group of police officers, who were 
not named parties and did not seek to intervene, appeared and 
"presented their objections to the District Court at the 
hearing." Id. at 303. When the court entered the consent 
decree, the latter group sought to appeal. Id. In holding that 
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the petitioners lacked standing to appeal, the Supreme Court 
noted that "[t]he rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those 
that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is 
well settled." Id. at 304. Although the Second Circuit had 
noted in dismissing the appeal that there might be exceptions to 
that general rule, the Supreme Court said, "We think the better 
practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for purposes 
of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course, appealable." 
Id. 
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsberg, 874 P.2d 729 (Nev. 
1994), cited by appellant in an earlier submission in this 
appeal,6 reached the same conclusion on similar facts. That 
case involved a shareholder suit that was resolved by a 
settlement after a hearing before the court. Appellants were 
other shareholders who appeared at the hearing to contest the 
settlement. The Nevada court in that case recognized that 
appellants were "aggrieved" by the trial court's order.7 They 
nonetheless lacked standing to appeal, held the court, because 
they were neither parties nor intervenors below. Id. at 734-35. 
6
 See Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to Sure-Tech, 
LLC's Motion to Dismiss, filed before the Supreme Court, App. No. 
950343, 9/25/95, at 9. 
7
 Appellants cited this case for the proposition "that 
the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an 
aggrieved party." That citation, while correct, does not support 
appellants' right to appeal, however, as they were not parties 
below. 
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Here, Schultz and Pett stand in the same position as 
did the petitioners in Marino and appellants in Valley Bank. 
Although they asserted an interest in the outcome of the 
litigation, they were not parties below and did not seek to 
intervene. Marino and Valley Bank teach that Schultz's 
appearance as a witness, even an aggrieved one, does not give him 
status as a party. 
B. Public Policy Also Dictates a Denial 
of Standing in This Instance. 
In addition to the controlling precedent,//£hree/public 
policy reasons exist here to deny standing to Schultz and Pett. 
First, the court disqualified Schultz from representing Sure-Tech 
in this lawsuit. (R. at 1235-40.) Schultz seeks to do an "end 
run" around that disqualification by doing on his own behalf what 
the court barred him from doing on behalf of Sure-Tech. Statute 
prevents that, however. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-112 specifically 
states: 
A member of a limited liability company is 
not a proper party to proceedings by or 
against a limited liability company, except 
when the object is to enforce a member's 
right against, or liability to, the limited 
liability company. 
Appellants' only possible claim to standing is their 
alleged status as members of Sure-Tech. Under no stretch of the 
imagination could this appeal be considered an action to enforce 
any rights appellants have against Sure-Tech. Instead, 
appellants seek to enforce Sure-Tech's "right" to continue 
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litigating this suit, by having the settlement dismissed. Thus, 
even had Schultz and Pett tried to intervene below, they would 
not be proper parties to the suit. Hence, they are not proper 
parties here. 
Second, Schultz is a long-time member of the Bar of 
this state. He formed Sure-Tech. He knows the Rules of Civil 
Procedure relating to intervention. He knows the steps one can 
take to otherwise legally protect one's interests. He knows the 
requirements of appellate procedure. Schultz also knew that the 
hearing would adjudicate an issue in which he claimed an 
interest. Yet, he chose not to seek to intervene or take other 
steps to preserve his alleged rights. 
Third, allowing these appellants to pursue their appeal 
would unleash a flood of potential appellants. Granting standing 
to these appellants on the basis of their claim of membership in 
the plaintiff limited liability company would grant limited 
liability company members and corporate shareholders the right to 
appeal settlements by or decisions against their limited 
liability company or corporation when they were dissatisfied with 
the outcome of the litigation. The existence of such a right is 
not only contrary to basic notions of standing, but it would 
wreak havoc on corporations and limited liability companies who 
could not be sure of the finality of any judgments to which they 
were a party. 
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Based on controlling law and the policy considerations 
enumerated above, the Court should rule that Schultz and Pett 
lack standing to bring this appeal. Even if the Court were to 
decide that Schultz and Pett have standing to bring this appeal, 
however, the appeal must be dismissed on the merits for the 
reasons discussed below. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BELOW FULLY SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION TO APPROVE 
THE STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL 
Appellants claim numerous infirmities with the court's 
decision to dismiss the action below. While appellants try to 
phrase many of the issues as questions of law, their main 
complaint with the trial court is factual: They argue that the 
trial court erred in not ruling that Schultz withdrew his offer 
to convey his interest in Sure-Tech to Evans prior to Evans' 
acceptance, and that Evans, therefore, had no authority to enter 
into the stipulation of settlement. These are clearly issues of 
fact. 
This Court must uphold the lower court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); 
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
"Findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or if the appellate court reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
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Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, it is axiomatic that the court may only 
consider the evidence before it in making its ruling. See Barker 
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Utah App. 1987) (party's 
failure to present evidence on damages at trial precludes 
subsequent consideration). Here, the facts before the trial 
court, as opposed to Schultz's opinions and late-filed documents, 
provide ample support for the trial court's determination that 
Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of settlement. 
The court found that: 
[B]ased on all of th[e] documents, and the conduct of 
the business owners, [] Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, at 
least for purposes of today's hearing, did not have any 
managerial responsibilities in Sure-Tech ....[when] 
a settlement agreement was entered into between the 
plaintiffs, Sure-Tech, LLC, and the defendants, EML 
Projects, et al. 
(Tr. at 70-71.) The court set forth on the record the evidence 
it relied on in reaching its conclusions. The first relevant 
fact, the court found, was that on 
November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans is the recipient of a 
letter authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein he stated as 
follows: "It is my intention to convey my interest in 
Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming that's Bob Pett, "will 
also convey his interest in Sure-Tech to you or to 
whoever you direct. Advise me to whom you wish it 
conveyed. I will not dismiss the case against EML so 
that you or whomever you direct can decide what to do." 
That's precisely what occurred several months later. 
"However, I am going to withdraw as counsel for Sure-
Tech after the conveyance and after the pending motions 
are decided." 
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(Tr. at 69-70.) Exhibit 6, received at Tr. 12, supports this 
finding. Both Schultz and Evans testified that the November 17, 
1994 letter operated as an offer to convey Schultz's and Pett's 
interests in Sure-Tech. (Tr. at 12, 25-26, 61.) (See also Tr. 
at 38-39 (Guyon agrees that the November 17th letter was intended 
to "do exactly what it said").) Moreover, in a colloquy with the 
judge, Guyon admitted that the November 17, 1994 letter contained 
no condition precedent or a time limit on acceptance. (Tr. at 
41-42.) 
The next document the court found significant was 
[T]he letter of January 9, 1995, the recipient being 
Mr. Charles A. Schultz, the author being Mr. Steve 
Evans. That letter confirms, in substance, their 
willingness to accept a conveyance, by Mr. Schultz and 
Mr. Pett, the withdrawal of any interest they have in 
Sure-Tech, and conveying any interest, whatever it may 
be, percentage-wise, of Sure-Tech to the Evanses. 
(Tr. at 70.) Exhibit 7, received at Tr. 12, supports this 
finding as does the uncontroverted testimony of Schultz (Tr. at 
27) and Evans (Tr. at 12). 
Schultz argues, however, that he withdrew the November 
17th offer before Evans accepted it, taking away Evans' power of 
acceptance and making Evans' actions, as a purported member of 
Sure-Tech, a nullity. His argument relies on his testimony that 
he revoked his offer in a letter he sent to Evans "ten days to 
two weeks after this November 17 letter" (Tr. at 27), and the 
proffered testimony of Lisa Spivey, Schultz's secretary, that she 
21 
mailed the letter. (Tr. at 55.) Evans denied ever receiving any 
revocation of the offer. (Tr. at 29.) 
Schultz did not introduce the "revocation" letter 
because he did not have it with him, although he testified it was 
in his files. (Tr. at 27-28. ) 8 Schultz mentioned no other 
correspondence concerning the offer to convey or its revocation 
at the hearing.9 Because Schultz could not produce the alleged 
revocation letter, the court struck Ms. Spivey's testimony and 
did not "give any substantial weight" to Schultz's testimony 
regarding the letter. (Tr. at 69.) 
Next, the court found relevant the April 9, 1995 
meeting of Sure-Tech members: 
[T]he April 9, 1995 meeting of the members of Sure-
Tech, LLC, wherein, in reliance on the documents of 
8
 Despite Schultz's readiness to introduce other 
documents into evidence, and despite ample time to send someone 
to get the letter, Schultz never did produce the document in 
court on May 3 0th. Schultz's argument that the court erred in 
not allowing him more time to get this letter incorrectly 
reflects the actual course of proceedings below and the law. 
(See Point IV.C. below.) His argument that the court should have 
reversed its decision when it did receive the letter after the 
hearing is addressed in Point V. below. 
9
 Nor did Schultz mention or allude to any other evidence 
of his revocation in his Rule 60(b) motion. (See November 22 
letter, attached as Exhibit 1 to Lisa Spivey's affidavit, Exhibit 
E to Pett's and Schultz's memorandum in support of their Rule 
60(b) motion.) (See R. at 1350-52, 1374.) The mention of 
another revocation letter from Schultz to Evans dated December 
22, 1994, first appeared in this case in appellants' memorandum 
in support of finding that appellants are parties to this 
proceeding. (R. at 1445-1503 at 1493.) Schultz's mention of 
that December 22 letter in his Statement of Facts No. 21 is 
disingenuous, at best. 
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November of 1994 and January of 1995, they conducted 
their business, substituted Mr. Schultz as the 
registered agent, replaced Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, 
pursuant to the prior agreement, as managers, and 
proceeded to designate new managers and new registered 
agents. 
(Tr. at 70.) The minutes of that meeting were introduced as 
Exhibit 5. Schultz did not contend that that meeting did not 
occur as reflected in Exhibit 5. Thus, that evidence is also 
uncontroverted. 
In further support of its factual finding that Schultz 
did convey to Evans whatever interest in Sure-Tech he owned, the 
court also cited Exhibit 11: 
[A] letter dated April 21, 1995, to Mr^Evans, authored 
by Mr. Schultz, wherein, in paragraph^g^MA Schultz 
again reconfirms that he and Mr. Peten^ij^r convey all 
interest in Sure-Tech. I mean, the only documents in 
the record before the Court are consistent in that 
regard. 
(Tr. at 70.)10 
The other factual challenge Schultz raises to the 
court's decision involves the veracity of Evans. The credibility 
of witnesses is uniquely the province of the trial judge, and an 
appellate court will not second guess the trial court. Sorenson 
10
 Schultz introduced evidence in the form of Sure-Tech's 
organizational documents and annual filings to show that he owned 
99% of Sure-Tech and that Evans owned none. (Exs. A-G and Tr. at 
53-60.) Evans disputed that showing, claiming he always had a 
membership interest based on his right to Sure-Tech's profits. 
(See Exs. 1 and 8 and Tr. at 8-10.) That evidence is all 
immaterial, however, given the court's finding that Schultz 
conveyed "all interest in Sure-Tech" to Evans via the November 
17th letter. (Tr. at 70.) (Emphasis added.) 
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v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d at 1147. To the extent 
that Judge Brian relied on the witnesses' testimony, he obviously 
found Evans' testimony credible. Because nothing in the record 
indicates that finding was clearly erroneous, it must be upheld. 
Id. Evans' testimony was consistent with the documentary 
evidence noted above that showed that whatever interest Schultz 
had in Sure-Tech prior to January 9, 1995 when Evans accepted 
Schultz's offer to convey his and Pett's interests in Sure-Tech 
to Evans, after that time he had no further interest. 
The foregoing recitation of the facts before the court 
shows that the great weight of the evidence before the court 
supports its factual findings and its determination to enter the 
stipulation of settlement or discounted Evans' testimony. Its 
ruling is not clearly against the weight of the evidence and must 
be upheld. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE COURT'S FACTUAL 
FINDINGS BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS 
Appellants' factual challenges to the court's decision 
that Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of 
settlement on behalf of Sure-Tech must fail for a second reason, 
as well. Contrary to appellate requirements in this state, 
appellants have failed to inform this Court of much of the 
evidence that supports the trial court's decision, either in 
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their statement of facts or in the body of their brief.11 Utah 
law requires that, 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of 
fact on appeal, n[a]n appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), quoting In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) . 
Marshalling the evidence requires that the appellant 
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 
939, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis in original). Because 
appellants have failed to marshal the evidence, this Court must 
accept as true the findings of the lower court. Interiors 
Contracting v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 933 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); accord. Commercial Union Assocs. v. 
11
 In fact, appellants' statement of facts contains more 
argument and procedural details than it does facts. Appellants 
characterize evidence supporting the trial court's decision as 
"false" or "purported" (see e.g., Appellants' Fact Nos. 16, 17, 
18), while they present evidence that supports their position as 
absolute fact. (See, e.g., Appellants' Fact No. 21.) 
Appellants' statement of facts also misrepresents the record at 
the time of the court's ruling, as it cites to documents and 
claims that were not before the court when it entered the Order 
of Dismissal. (See Appellant's Fact Nos. 2, 21, 28, 29, 35-40, 
which all refer to items entered in the record subsequent to the 
challenged ruling.) 
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Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Robb v. Anderton, 
863 P.2d at 1328. 
Although the record in the case is over 1500 pages in 
length, the salient facts were all introduced at one two-hour 
set forth tfte faiTCsne deemed important in his ruling from the 
bench at the close of the May 30th hearing. (Tr. at 69-71.) 
The task of marshalling the facts on this appeal was thus a 
simple one. In spite of the simplicity and importance of the 
task, however, appellants failed to inform this Court of the 
following facts that support the trial court's ruling: 
1. Schultz admitted under oath that in his November 17, 
1994 letter to Evans he offered to convey his interest 
in Sure-Tech to Evans. (Tr. at 25-25, 61) .12 
2. In the November 17th letter, Schultz indicated that he 
would "not dismiss the case against EML so that you or 
whomever you direct can decide what to do." (Ex. 6; 
see also Tr. at 69.) (Emphasis added.) 
3. Counsel for appellants admitted the November 17th offer 
did not contain any condition precedent or time 
limitation on Evans' right to accept. (Tr. at 42.) 
12
 Instead, Schultz misleadingly states in Fact No. 17 
that Evans "claimed that Mr. Schultz had sent Evans a letter 
offering to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's ownership of 
Sure-Tech to the Evanses." 
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4. Schultz understood that at all times the Evanses had 
rights to a significant share of the profits of Sure-
Tech. (See PL's Exs. 1 and 8; Tr. at 25, 57-58 
(testimony of Schultz).) 
5. On April 21, 1995, Schultz again confirmed his intent 
to convey all his interest in Sure-Tech to Evans. 
(PI.'s Ex. 11; Tr. at 70.) 
6. The Evanses held a meeting of members of Sure-Tech in 
April 9, 1995, at which time they voted to replace 
Schultz as registered agent for Sure-Tech and replace 
both Pett and Schultz as managers of Sure-Tech. (Tr. 
at 7. ) 
7. Evans then caused Sure-Tech to file amended Articles of 
Organization on April 10, 1995. (Tr. at 20; see also 
PL's Ex. 2 at 2.) 
A comparison between these omitted facts and the full 
panoply of facts the court cited in reaching its decision shows 
that appellants omitted from their facts virtually all the facts 
that support the court's ruling. Having failed to inform this 
Court of these facts, which support the court's decision, Schultz 
should not be allowed to challenge the factual basis for the 
court's decision. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ARE EACH CORRECT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Appellants also challenge four of the court's rulings 
on legal grounds. They challenge the court's reliance on Evans' 
testimony, the court's finding that Evans had authority to act on 
behalf of Sure-Tech, the court's alleged failure to allow Schultz 
time to get the November 22nd letter, and the court's alleged 
preclusion of Lisa Spivey's testimony. (See Points I, II, III 
and IV of Appellants' Br.) As shown below, each of these 
challenges is based on a false premise. Moreover, when reviewed 
for correctness, as conclusions of law must be, each of the 
court's rulings withstands appellants' challenge. 
A. The Court Committed No Error in Accepting 
Evans' Testimony. 
Appellants first claim that the court erred as a matter 
of law in basing its decision on Evans' "perjured" testimony. 
That argument has no merit. Though cloaked in the guise of a 
legal argument, appellants' claim of perjury is in reality no 
more than a claim that the trial judge erred as a matter of fact 
in its decision. As noted above, the credibility of a witness is 
for the trial judge, and will not be set aside absent clear 
error. Moreover, trial courts also have a great deal of 
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. Russell 
v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993). 
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In any event, appellants failed to raise and preserve 
the issue below. An appellant may only raise on appeal issues 
presented and preserved below. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 
(Utah Ct, App. 1992); see also Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 
999-1000 (Utah 1993); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) . Preservation requires a "contemporaneous objection 
or some form of specific preservation of claims of error." State 
v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 360. The grounds for the objections "must 
be 'distinctly and specifically stated' on the record." Estate 
of Russell, 852 P.2d at 1000 (quoting Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 
14 (Utah 1988)). As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "A 
reviewing court . . . is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
Schultz did not adequately preserve his claim of 
perjury below, because his only basis for impeaching Evans' 
testimony was improper and disallowed by the judge. Schultz 
attempted to call Evans' veracity into question by asking Evans 
if he had ever been convicted of a felony. (Tr. at 29.) Judge 
Brian properly refused to permit that line of questioning, as the 
conviction had been expunged. (Tr. at 33.)13 
13
 The impropriety of this line of questioning is 
heightened by the fact that Schultz represented Evans in 
connection with the expungement. (See Tr. at 32.) 
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Even if Schultz had raised below either of the 
allegations he makes in appellants' brief in support of his claim 
of perjury, this Court could not consider those allegations here. 
Appellants allege in their brief that the court should have 
disregarded Evans' testimony for two reasons: first, that 
E.M.L.P. fired Evans for dishonesty, and second, that Evans was 
"scheduled for a perjury hearing" before Judge Frederick. (See 
Appellants' Br. at 15.) 
The mere allegation of a false affidavit made in Judge 
Frederick's court an the claim of dishonesty in the E.M.L.P. 
letter, are inadmissible to impeach Evans. Rule 609, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, only allows use of a conviction. Furthermore, it 
requires the corroborating testimony of the witness, or a 
properly certified copy of the conviction. State v. Peterson, 
560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). Here, Schultz only has an 
unsubstantiated allegation.14 
14
 In addition to the evidentiary rules precluding the 
admission of the alleged evidence of Evans' lack of truthfulness, 
Schultz once again mischaracterizes the "facts" on which he 
relies. By his reference to an alleged "perjury hearing" before 
Judge Frederick, Schultz likely refers to a minute entry dated 
May 11, 1993 in the matter of Evans-Bradshaw, Inc. v. Unimarc 
Corp., No 920902551CV (Third Jud. Dist. Ct.). That minute entry 
indicates that Evans, whom Schultz represented, filed an 
affidavit which the other side moved to strike, at least in part, 
on a claim of falsity. The court took that issue under 
advisement "pending trial." The case was dismissed for failure 
to prosecute and no further action on the allegation occurred. 
(See Minute Entry, dated 5-11-93 and docket sheet, attached 
hereto as Appendix Tab E.) 
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Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, would preclude both 
the E.M.L.P. letter and the claim of a false affidavit to attack 
Evans' credibility. That rule precludes using extrinsic evidence 
to show specific instances of the conduct of a witness, other 
than a conviction introduced pursuant to Rule 609. (Utah R. 
Evid. 608.) 
Finally, appellants have no basis for their claim that 
the trial court "based its decision" on Evans' testimony. The 
court's statements from the bench showed it relied, in large 
part, on the documentary evidence presented to it. (See Tr. at 
69-71.) That evidence is consistent with the testimony of Evans 
and forms a sufficient basis for the court's decision. 
B. The Court Correctly Ruled That Evans Had 
Authority to Dismiss This Action on Behalf 
of Sure-Tech. 
Appellants next challenge the court's legal basis for 
finding that the Evanses had authority to dismiss the case on 
behalf of Sure-Tech. For this challenge appellants rely on the 
organizing documents of Sure-Tech. Those documents do show that 
Schultz and Pett were the only members of Sure-Tech prior to 
November 17, 1994. (See trial Exs. 4, A, B, D, F and G.)15 
15
 Appellants also introduced exhibits to show that after 
Evans accepted Schultz's offer to convey his interest, Schultz 
attempted to reassert control of Sure-Tech. (See Exs. C and E.) 
Those documents apparently were introduced in support of 
Schultz's claim that he withdrew his offer to convey--a claim the 
court properly rejected. (See Points II and III above.) Neither 
was dated between the date of Schultz's offer and the date of 
Evans' acceptance, however, and both are inconsistent with Evans' 
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Those exhibits are immaterial, however, in light of the court's 
factual finding that on November 17, 1994, Schultz and Pett 
agreed to convey to Evans their entire interest in Sure-Tech, 
whatever that interest was. Thus, even if prior to January 7, 
1995 appellants had owned 100% of Sure-Tech, when Sure-Tech 
executed the stipulation of settlement in April 1995, they no 
longer did. 
Schultz then argues, without citation (and to this 
Court for the first time), that "if the Evanses wished to hold 
Mr. Schultz to his offer to convey ownership they had to file 
suit" against him and Pett to enforce the agreement. The Utah 
Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") contains no such 
requirement, however. Under both the Act and the Sure-Tech 
0perating Agreement, this written agreement to transfer their 
membership to the Evanses and give him authority to enter into 
the stipulation of settlement effectively did so. First, even 
when management is vested in managers rather than members, the 
members of a limited liability company retain the authority to 
remove and replace managers. (Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125(2) (a) 
(managers shall be any person "elected by members") and § 48-2b-
125(3) (managers hold office accorded them by members).) 
acceptance and his acts subsequent to that acceptance. 
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Second, the very section of the Act appellants cite 
(Appellants' Br. at 16) supports the court's ruling that Evans 
became a member of Sure-Tech by Schultz's November 17 offer: 
[A]dditional members may be admitted as provided in the 
operating agreement or, if the operating agreement does 
not provide for the admission of additional members, 
with the written consent of all members. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-122. The operating agreement provides 
that: 
No new Members may be added without the unanimous 
written consent of the present Members. New Members 
may only be added by written consent of the present 
Members and upon such terms and conditions as specified 
by the present Members. 
(Ex. A at 13, % 12.3.) 
Appellants argue that these passages require more than 
Schultz's and Pett's offer to convey their interests. (See 
Appellants' Br. at 17.) Both the Act and the Operating Agreement 
contain only one prerequisite to the admission of new members, 
however: written consent of the old members. Schultz's letter to 
Evans satisfied that requirement. Appellants' claim that Pett 
and Schultz "never signed any written document agreeing to add 
the Evanses or anyone else as members of Sure-Tech" (id.) is 
simply false. Once Evans accepted Schultz's offer, nothing more, 
except filing the amended Articles with the state once the new 
members were admitted, was required to admit Evans and transfer 
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him to the authority to enter into the stipulation of 
dismissal .16 
If appellants seek to assert any failure to follow 
formalities required by the Operating Agreement for the transfer 
of Schultz's and Pett's interests to the Evanses, their failure 
to raise the issue below bars it here. Sukin, 842 P.2d at 926. 
The entire focus of Schultz's argument below was whether or not 
Schultz withdrew his November 17, 1994 offer, not whether that 
offer was sufficient to actually convey any interest. (See Tr. 
at 35-37, 39-42, 49, 51-52, 55, 59-60, 65, 66-67.) Schultz 
argued only that the Evanses never had any interest in Sure-Tech 
because he withdrew his offer to convey an interest to them, 
thus, no one but he could have had authority to dismiss the 
lawsuit. The court found to the contrary, however. Thus, once 
the Evanses accepted the transfer on January 9, 1995, delivery 
was complete and Schultz and Pett were powerless to regain 
whatever interest they had previously owned. 
C. The Court Made No Reversible Error in its 
Decision to Rule Without the November 22nd 
Letter Before it or Concerning the Proffered 
Testimony of Lisa Spivey. 
In their and fourth challenges to the court's legal 
rulings, appellants argue that the court committed reversible 
16
 The hearing transcript indicates that the court had 
before it the Amendments to the Articles of Organization filed by 
Lionel Koon, Fred Evans and Steve Evans, but no such document is 
in the exhibits in the record. (See Tr. at 54-55.) 
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error in not allowing Schultz the opportunity to get the November 
22nd letter and not allowing Lisa Spivey to testify. These 
challenges suffer a greater infirmity than merely being legally 
wrong. They also misrepresent the trial court's rulings and 
misstate the record in numerous respects. 
Appellants first claim they did not have the November 
22nd letter at the hearing because they were unaware that the 
court would take evidence at the May 3 0th hearing. That 
assertion is false. Mr. Daniels' request for the hearing, a copy 
of which was sent to appellant Schultz, clearly stated that the 
purpose of the hearing was to take evidence. (See R. at 1261-
63.) Moreover, regardless of their notice, appellants came to 
the hearing prepared to put on evidence. They introduced seven 
documents into evidence, put Schultz on the witness stand, and 
proffered the testimony of Lisa Spivey, who was present in court 
and could have testified, had they chosen to have her do so. 
(See Tr. at 53-64.) In fact, the court gave appellants every 
opportunity to put evidence into the record, admitting some over 
the objection of plaintiff (see Tr. at 19), and allowing them to 
put on additional evidence when the parties to this case were 
ready to submit the issue. (Tr. at 50.) Appellants never 
objected to the taking of evidence, asked for a continuance or 
otherwise preserved their right to raise the issue before this 
Court. 
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In any event, Judge Brian did not prevent appellants 
from putting the November 22nd letter into evidence. They had 
ample opportunity to produce the letter in court and simply 
failed to do so. Even if they didn't realize the November 22, 
1994 letter would matter before the hearing, its importance 
should have become apparent early in the hearing when Evans 
testified that Schultz had offered to convey his interest in 
Sure-Tech to Evans and offered into evidence Exhibit 6. (Tr. at 
11-12.)17 Schultz then testified that he had revoked his offer 
shortly after making it, and stated that he had the letter in his 
files. (Tr. at 27-28.) Evans denied ever having received such a 
letter. (Tr. at 29.) 
Appellants' attorney realized that without the November 
22nd letter, he had "some evidentiary problems," and asked for a 
"short recess" to confer with Schultz. (Tr. at 35.) Instead of 
seeking a recess to get the letter, however, appellants' attorney 
decided to "leave that issue, because of lack of evidence" and 
move on to other arguments. (Tr. at 3 7.) 
Later in the hearing, Guyon did ask the court for more 
time to send someone to procure the letter. (Tr. at 4 9.) The 
court left it up to counsel for the parties, who indicated they 
were ready to proceed, but "if the letter is here . . . when you 
17
 Guyon objected to the testimony on the ground that it 
involved "settlement negotiations." The court properly overruled 
that objection, and appellants have not complained of that ruling 
here. 
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are still considering it, I have no objection to it." (Tr. at 
50.) Guyon did not object to that arrangement. (Id.) Guyon 
then presented further evidence in an attempt to prove the 
withdrawal of the offer. (Tr. at 53-64.) When Guyon again asked 
for more time to get the letter at the close of evidence, the 
court responded that "If the letter arrives before you are 
through, assuming there isn't some type of filibuster in the 
argument, we will consider it." (Tr. at 65.) 
At no time did Guyon object to this approach. As the 
court noted at the close of proceedings, the hearing lasted over 
two hours. (Tr. at 69.) This gave appellants plenty of time to 
send someone to get the letter.18 They cannot now complain of 
their failure to have what they considered a key piece of 
evidence. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d at 554. A trial judge has 
significant discretion over the control of his or her courtroom 
and it is not an abuse of discretion to close the evidence two 
hours into a one-half hour hearing. See Russell v. Russell, 852 
P.2d at 998; Utah R. Evid. 611(a). 
It is also untrue that Judge Brian precluded Ms. Spivey 
from testifying. The court specifically invited appellants to 
"augment the record by way of proffer or by calling the 
18
 After Schultz's direct testimony, counsel for plaintiff 
moved the court to strike his testimony regarding the revocation 
letter. (Tr. at 59.) The court overruled the motion to "give 
counsel an opportunity to connect it." Schultz then stated that 
he had sent his nephew to get the letter. (Tr. at 60.) 
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witnesses.11 (Tr. at 53 (emphasis added).) Appellants called 
Schultz (Tr. at 56), but chose to proffer testimony of Ms. 
Spivey, Schultz's secretary, instead of putting her on the stand. 
(Tr. at 53.) The decision not to put Ms. Spivey on the stand, 
even though she was in court, was thus appellants', not the 
court's. 
Nor did the court err in ruling that the Best Evidence 
Rule, Rule 1004, Utah Rules of Evidence, required that Schultz 
have the document in court.19 Rule 1002, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, requires that "the original writing is required to 
prove the content of a writing, except as otherwise provided in 
these rules."20 Rule 1004 states that other evidence of the 
contents of a writing is admissible if the original is lost or 
destroyed, is not obtainable by any available judicial process, 
is in the control of the opponent or the writing relates to a 
collateral matter. Utah R. Evid. 1004. None of those exceptions 
apply here. Thus, it was incumbent on Schultz to have the 
November 22, 1994 letter, or a photocopy of it, to prove its 
contents. 
19
 Although the court allowed the testimony, it did 
sustain Sure-Tech's motion to strike her testimony. It may be 
that appellants challenge that ruling here, although they do not 
specifically mention that ruling and did not take exception to 
it. 
20
 Rule 1003 allows a duplicate to be used as an original 
barring questions of authenticity. 
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Even appellants admit as much. (See Appellants' Br. at 
19.) Thus, as Ms. Spivey could not competently testify as to the 
contents of the letter (and no such proffer was made), her 
testimony was irrelevant. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that 
the missing letter did in fact revoke Schultz's November 17th 
offer,21 a revocation only becomes effective on communication to 
the offeree. See Butler v. Wehrley, 425 P.2d 130, 134 (Az. App. 
1967). This requirement of communication means that the offeree 
must have actual knowledge of the revocation. Id., citing 17 
C.J.S. Contracts § 50D, p. 712. Because Ms. Spivey could not 
provide such evidence (see Tr. at 55), her proffered testimony 
was immaterial, and the court's rulings concerning her testimony 
were correct. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANTS' 
RULE 60(b) MOTION 
The trial court properly denied appellants' Rule 60(b) 
motion, which is directed to the sound discretion of the judge. 
See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); 
Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973) (construing identical 
provision of federal Rule 60(b)(3)). Their claim that the court 
21
 Such an assumption would be wrong. The November 22nd 
letter, which appellants later sent to the court, contains no 
language of revocation. (See Appellee's Fact No. 24, R. at 1302; 
see also Point V, below.) 
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committed reversible error in denying the motion suffers legal 
and factual infirmities, just as do appellants' other claims of 
error. The "proof" appellants provided to the court in their 
motion falls so far short of being "irrefutable" (see Appellants' 
Br. at 20), that, in fact, appellants' Rule 60(b) submission 
provides further support for the trial court's decision. 
Appellants made their motion under Rule 60(b)(3), which 
allows a trial judge to set aside a final judgment or order on 
the basis of fraud (whether heretofore denominated as intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party. (Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).) Although several 
Utah cases refer to Rule 60(b)(3), none squarely address the 
merits of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Utah law is settled, however, 
that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See, 
e.g.f Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) . 
Federal courts interpreting the identical provision in 
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also 
require clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Wilkin v. 
Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d at 717; see also Ervin v. Wilkinson, 701 
F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1983); Jennings v. Hicklin, 587 F.2d 946, 
948 (8th Cir. 1978) . The fraud must have been discovered after 
the entry of judgment, and the movant must show he would have had 
a good claim or defense. Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d at 
717. 
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Here, appellants simply failed to carry their burden on 
their Rule 60(b)(3) motion. No action by the parties to the 
litigation prevented Schultz from presenting the evidence. Cf. 
Ervin, 701 F.2d at 61. Moreover, a review of the letter itself 
demonstrates that it in no way supports Schultz's claims. It 
simply does not amount to a revocation of Schultz's November 17th 
offer to convey his and Pett's Sure-Tech interests. (See 
Appellants' Fact No. 24; R. at 13 02.) Finally, as shown above in 
Point IV.C, appellants could have had the letter in court, had 
they chosen to. Schultz admitted at the hearing he had the 
missing letter in his file. (Tr. at 27-28.) The appellants 
failed to meet their burden on their Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The 
trial court's denial of that motion was well within its 
discretion and should be sustained. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DAMAGES TO E.M.L.P. AGAINST 
SCHULTZ PURSUANT TO RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 
FOR BRINGING THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires the Court to award sanctions against a party or a 
party's attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal: " [I]f the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules 
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages 
. . . ." Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P. (Emphasis added.) Damages 
may include single or double costs, and may include attorneys' 
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fees. Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P.; Porco v. Porcof 752 P.2d 365, 
369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The rule defines a frivolous appeal as "one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based o a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Utah R. App. P. 33(b); see also Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416-
17 (Utah 1990); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-10 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). In Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court rules that "[s]ince 
a valid professional evaluation would reveal a complete lack of 
merit to the cause of action and because of the otherwise 
unprofessional presentation of this case on appeal, we hold that 
plaintiff's counsel violated rule 33 and is therefore subject to 
sanction." 785 P.2d at 417. In O'Brien, this court fund an 
appeal to be frivolous where the defendant's claim simply 
controverted the findings of the lower court and was "without 
basis in law or fact." 744 P.2d at 310. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have awarded 
Rule 33 sanctions in other cases as well. Thus, in Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Court awarded 
sanctions where appellant had no basis for his arguments and 
mischaracterized and misrepresented the law and the evidence.22 
22
 In Eames, decided before the 1990 revision of Rule 33 
that added the definitions in section (b), this Court found that 
"frivolous" included a requirement that the appellant have 
brought the appeal in bad faith. That requirement was rejected 
in O'Brien. 744 P.2d at 309-10. 
42 
In Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
this Court applied sanctions against an attorney who chose to 
ignore the decision of the lower court and attempted to 
relitigate the issues on appeal. Id. at 63. 
Here, the actions of Schultz, as detailed above, are 
especially egregious. After having been disqualified by the 
trial court from representing the plaintiff, Schultz challenged 
the plaintiff's authority to replace him based on his claimed 
ownership of plaintiff. He did so without entering an appearance 
in the case, however, and did not put into evidence the key 
documents on which he now relies to show tat he revoked his offer 
to convey his interest in plaintiff to Evans. Having been 
unsuccessful both at the hearing and in his Rule 60(b) motion, 
Schultz now attempts to relitigate the issues here. 
His appeal meets the definition of a "frivolous appeal" 
in three ways. First, it mischaracterizes and misrepresents both 
the law (to the extent the appeal concerns itself with the law at 
all) (see Point IV above) and the facts (see Point II above). 
Eames, 735 P.2d at 397. Second, the appeal is a naked attempt to 
relitigate the very issues decided below. See Schoney, 863 P.2d 
at 63/ Hunt, 785 P.2d at 417. Third, the appeal has necessitated 
the response of defendant E.M.L.P., to whom Schultz's unfounded 
charges are merely collateral and who negotiated in good faith 
with Evans to reach the stipulated settlement of the litigation. 
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Under these circumstances, defendant E.M.L.P. requests 
that the Court enter sanctions against Schultz and Pett for 
double their costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in 
responding to this frivolous appeal, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
X 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's May 30, 1995 
order of dismissal, as appellants here are nonparties and as such 
have no standing to bring the appeal, and because appellants have 
failed to show any factual or legal error by the court. 
DATED this S ^ day of March, 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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